Dementia, Decision-Making, and the Modern (Adult) Guardianship Paradigm: Bentley v Maplewood Seniors Care Society by Hall, Margaret I. (Margaret Isabel Hall (mhall)) (author)
   (2015) 1 CJCCL 293
Dementia, Decision-Making, and 
the Modern (Adult) Guardianship 
Paradigm:  Bentley v Maplewood 
Seniors Care Society
Margaret Isabel Hall*
Th is paper considers the meaning of decision-making, including substitute decision-
making, for persons with dementia. Th e paper discusses the historical development of 
adult guardianship, from the King’s stewardship of the property of “fools” and “lunatics” 
to the modern mechanisms of substitute decision-making, and the relationship between 
substitute decision-making and a particular ideal of autonomy. Th e paper concludes with 
a discussion of Bentley v Maplewood Seniors Care Society, a case concerning the 
present choices of a woman with dementia, the decisions set out in the “living will” she 
drafted many years earlier (prior to dementia), and the decisions made by the woman’s 
(purported) representatives on her behalf.  Th e case invites us to consider whether the 
decisions of the former, mentally capable self can ever trump the choices of the current 
self with dementia.
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Th ompson Rivers University.
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I.  Introduction
The case of Bentley v Maplewood 1 raises a number of profound questions about the nature of self in dementia, the nature and signifi cance of 
“decisions” and “decision-making,” and the role of substitute decision-
makers (including the former self through an advance directive) vis-à-vis 
the person with dementia. What is the nature of consent for an individual 
with advanced dementia, who departs in dramatic physical and mental 
ways from the norm (including his or her former “normal” self ), and how 
can it be recognised? Should consent ever be separated from decision-
making and if so, why and under what circumstances? What are the 
ethical implications of enabling a former self to make life terminating 
decisions on behalf of a fundamentally changed present self? What is 
the role of the individual’s representative in this situation? As Ronald 
Dworkin would have it (see discussion, infra), should a person’s prior 
(intellectual) decision override contrary (embodied) behaviour by the 
present self-with-dementia? What is “decision-making” and why does it 
matter? 
Th is article considers the issues raised by the Bentley case, as they 
both illustrate and challenge the modern adult guardianship paradigm.  
1. 2014 BCSC 165 [Bentley].
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II.  Autonomy Th rough Decision-Making: Th e   
 Modern Adult Guardianship Paradigm
Th e modern adult guardianship paradigm is predicated on a particular 
theory about autonomy, individualism, decision-making, and the 
relationship between them. “Decision” (for the purposes of this theory) 
refers to a specifi c kind of choice, a “conclusion or resolution reached 
after consideration”;2 mere choices are not decisions. A conclusion arrived 
at through this process of consideration (because it has been arrived at 
through this process) is understood to be the person’s “own” free, and 
therefore autonomous, decision. Control of one’s own decisions and 
decision-making process is essential to one’s identity as an individual; the 
individual, in turn, tends to make the kind of decision that is consistent 
with his or her identity. Th e ability to make a diff erent out-of-character 
kind of decision, however, for whatever reason, is integral to personal 
freedom and must be respected.  
In this account, the ability to carry out the process of decision-making 
is essential to both autonomy and individual identity. “Mental” or 
“decision-making capacity” (sometimes referred to as competence) refers 
to this ability. Th e content of decisions arrived at through this process is 
irrelevant so long as one is capable of making a “real” decision about the 
matter at hand: “[t]he right knowingly to be foolish is not unimportant; the 
right to voluntarily assume risks is to be respected. Th e State has no business 
meddling with either. Th e dignity of the individual is at stake.”3  Autonomy 
in this sense (as exercised through autonomous decision-making) is a core 
legal value, long recognised by the common law and equity (through the 
doctrines of undue infl uence and duress)4 and protected by the right to 
life, liberty and security of the person guaranteed by section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.5  
2. Oxford Dictionaries, sub verbo “decision”, online: Oxford Dictionaries 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/defi nition/english/decision>. 
3. Koch (Re) (1997), 33 OR (3d) 485 (Gen Div) at para 17, Quinn J.
4. Which recognize that, in certain factual situations, an otherwise mentally 
capable person’s ability to make free decisions may be overborne.
5. R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30 at 171, Wilson J, concurring (the 
majority agreed with Justice Wilson on this point); Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B 
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Consent refers to a particular type of decision; to allow something 
that would otherwise be un-allowed. As with other kinds of decisions, 
the person who does not have the mental capacity required to consent 
cannot, truly, consent. Th e doctrine of informed consent6 is premised 
on the idea that a person cannot make her “own” “real” decision about 
a matter if she lacks the information she needs to understand the choice 
involved, and the implications of making it.   
Th e person who is identifi ed as unable to carry out the decision-making 
process (as lacking mental or decision-making capacity) poses a problem 
for this account. On the one hand, to hold a person to the consequences 
of a decision that is not really her “own” seems unfair. On the other hand, 
making decisions for that person negates her identity as autonomous.  
Th e modern guardianship paradigm appears to resolve this problem 
through the mechanisms of substitute and supported decision-making. 
Substitute decision-making enables the autonomy of the person whose 
decision-making processes are impaired by enabling her substitute to eff ect 
the decisions she would have made if able to do so.  Th e substitute is not a 
replacement; he or she operates as a kind of decision-making amanuensis, 
eff ecting decisions that “really” belong to the other. Proceeding on the 
basis that persons generally make decisions like those they have made in 
the past, the substitute is able to maintain the identity of the individual 
by perpetuating this kind of consistent decision-making. Supported 
decision-making is a variation on this idea, providing a less intrusive 
mechanism for enabling autonomous decision-making.7 Th e objective in 
both cases is the same: to enable the individual to formulate and express 
his or her “own” decisions and to have those decisions recognized and 
enforced by the law.  
Th e theoretical account outlined above is a story; a story about how 
people think and about how they behave.  It is a story which resonates, 
profoundly, with broader cultural and political values. But, however 
to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
6. Malette v Shulman (1990), 72 OR (2d) 417 (CA).
7. Th e supported decision-making model was developed within the 
developmental disability community, for whom the “substitute” model 
is much less coherent (there being no former “competent” identity to 
perpetuate).  
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attractive the narrative, it is not real. It is a social construct, and its 
application, to be justifi ed, depends on its workability:
If ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems are instrumental 
to an active reorganization of the given environment, to a removal of some 
specifi c trouble and perplexity, then the test of their validity and value lies 
in accomplishing this work. If they succeed in their offi  ce, they are reliable, 
sound, valid, good, true. If they fail to clear up confusion, to eliminate 
defects, if they increase confusion, uncertainty and evil when they are 
acted upon, then are they false. Confi rmation, corroboration, verifi cation 
lie in works, consequences ... By their fruits shall ye know them.8  
III. Historical Context: Situating the Modern   
 Paradigm
Th e modern adult guardianship paradigm is the most recent iteration 
of a very old concept: that a public obligation of some kind is owed 
to persons whose processes of thought and mind are seen to create or 
exacerbate vulnerability.  
Th e English system of guardianship, from which the Canadian 
system derives, originated sometime before the 13th century as a personal 
obligation of the King. 9 Th e obligation was limited to the protection and 
stewardship of property, and distinguished between “idiots” or “fools” 
(individuals never having possessed the mental ability required to manage 
their property) and “lunatics” or non compos mentis (those losing this 
ability as adults). Non compos mentis individuals were treated by the law 
8. J Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948) at 156 
[emphasis in original].
9. Th e obligation is fi rst mentioned in, although apparently not created 
by, the Statute De Prerogativa Regis in the late thirteenth century.  Doug 
Surtees provides an excellent summary of the murky origins of the 
Crown’s jurisdiction, which replaced the feudal arrangement whereby 
the Lord of the Manor assumed control of the property of persons 
of “unsound mind.” Th is assertion of Kingly jurisdiction has been 
explained as a response to abuses of this power committed by the lords, 
or, alternatively, as part of the general extension of centralised Crown 
jurisdiction during this period; D Surtees, “How Goes the Battle? An 
Exploration of Guardianship Reform” (2012) 50:1 Alta L Rev 115. Prior 
to assumption by the King at some point during the reign of Edward I 
(1272- 1307); see also Lawrence B Custer, “Th e Origins of the Doctrine 
of Parens Patriae” (1978) 27:2 Emory LJ 195 at 195.
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as if they could regain mental capacity in the future (whether or not they 
currently enjoyed “lucid” moments) and, accordingly, the Crown was 
required to manage the property of such a person on that person’s behalf, 
taking no profi ts. Having “once lived his life on an equal mental footing 
with others … there was always that glimmer of  hope that he would do 
so again,”10 and should a lunatic regain lucidity (either permanently or 
episodically) his property and profi ts would be returned. Th e property 
of fools, on the other hand, who would never regain capabilities they 
had never enjoyed, was managed on behalf of the Crown. Th e profi ts 
from their estates became the king’s property, subject only to the king’s 
duties to provide the incapable individual with the necessities of life, not 
commit waste or destruction, and to pass the estate to any heirs upon 
death.  
Th e Crown’s “power of administration” over the property of both 
lunatics and fools was delegated personally to the Lord Chancellor (and, 
later, to the Lord Justices of Appeal in Chancery), as opposed to the 
equitable jurisdiction of the Chancellor regarding children. Over time, 
however, it appears that this power of administration developed in 
practice into something like an equitable jurisdiction, “[by] virtue of [the 
Chancellor’s] general power, as holding the great seal, and keeper of the 
King’s conscience.”11 Also over time, the property of fools came to be 
managed according to the same standards as the property of lunatics, 
and the de facto distinction between the two categories withered away. 
No precise moment or mechanism through which this change took 
place is apparent; Professor Surtees, in his account, directs the reader to 
Blackstone’s comment that “the ‘clemency of the crown and pity of juries’ 
gradually assimilated the condition of idiots to that of lunatics.” 12 In a 
similar way, over time and with no marked turning point, the Crown 
10. Louise Harmon, “Falling Off  the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of 
Substituted Ju dgment” (1990-91) 100:1 Yale LJ 1 at 16.
11. Ibid at 19, citing Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence: as 
Administered in England and America, 12th ed (Boston: Little Brown, 
1877) at 608.  
12. Surtees, supra note 9 at 117; see also Sarah Burningham, “Developments 
in Canadian Adult Guardianship and Co-Decision Making Law” (2009) 
18 Dal J Leg Stud 119. 
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(through the Chancery) assumed responsibility for the personal care and 
wellbeing of both lunatics and fools, in addition to property stewardship 
(although personal responsibilities were most often in fact carried out by 
families).  
Th e core tenets of the modern adult guardianship paradigm began 
to take shape with the Imperial Lunacy Act of 1890.13 First, a new 
unifi ed category of the “mentally infi rm” removed altogether the archaic 
distinction between lunatics and idiots. Second, the Act eff ectively 
privatised the formerly public obligation, setting out procedures for 
appointing an agent to manage the property of the infi rm.14 Th ird, by 
permitting the use of medical evidence (provided through affi  davit) 
in place of a full judicial inquiry, the Act eff ectively medicalised the 
guardianship process; although both the declaration of disorder/
incapacity justifying guardianship and the appointment of a guardian 
remained the responsibility of the court (with the exception of “statutory 
guardianship” where applicable15) medical evidence of decision-making 
capacity is virtually always determinative.
Substitute decision-making had been introduced earlier in the 19th 
century in the case of Ex parte Whitbread16 as a means of allowing the 
law to eff ect what could not otherwise be done: to make a distribution 
of property from the estate of a wealthy “lunatic” to his impecunious, 
but competent, relative.17 Such a distribution, with the court taking the 
private property of one person for the benefi t of another, confl icted with 
the core liberal legal value of private property ownership. It would also 
13. 53 & 54 Vict c 5.
14. Burningham, supra note 12.
15. “Statutory guardianship” refers to the mechanism whereby the Public 
Guardian or Trustee (or analogous body depending on the language of the 
jurisdiction) may be appointed as guardian of property or estate through 
medical evidence only. Th e process in British Columbia (originally 
developed to apply where an individual had been institutionalised) allows 
for the Public Guardian and Trustee to be appointed as guardian of 
estate on the basis of a Certifi cate of Incapacity issued by the director of 
a Provincial mental health facility or psychiatric unit designated for this 
purpose under the Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288 and/or under 
the Patients Property Act, RSBC 1996, c 349.
16. 35 Eng Rep 878 (Ch 1816) [Ex Parte Whitbread].
17. Harmon, supra note 10.
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appear to have been prohibited by the court’s mandate (as descended 
from the King’s obligation) to preserve the lunatic’s estate in his or her 
interests.18 Th e “fi ction” of substitute decision-making allowed the court 
to “discover what the lunatic himself probably would have done” and 
carry out those “probable desires” through the adoption of an “internal, 
subjective point of view.”19 According to this fi ction, the gift to the 
niece was “really” in her uncle’s interest because it was “really” what he 
would have decided to do had he been mentally capable of making that 
decision. Th e closeness of the family relation together with “[e]vidence 
of the lunatic’s former intentional states” were essential to this exercise.20 
Th ese 19th century innovations – privatization, medicalization, 
and substitute decision-making – comprise the conceptual core of the 
modern adult guardianship paradigm. All three are connected to, and 
dependent upon, one another. Th e substitute decision-making model has 
come to defi ne adult guardianship in terms of both purpose (as a response 
to impaired decision-making) and function (the implementation of 
autonomous decision-making mechanisms). Th e legal requirement of 
“fi nding” decision-making impairment (as a pre-requisite to appointing a 
substitute or supportive decision-maker) has, in turn, enhanced medical 
control over the process. Medically produced evidence of decision-making 
capacity, presented in hard and scientifi c language of the “bio-fact,”21 is 
seldom questioned by legal decision-makers when legal decision-makers 
18. Ibid (“[T]he Court… has nothing to consider but the situation of the 
Lunatic himself, always looking to the probability of his recovery, and 
never regarding the interest of next of kin” at 22, citing Lord Eldron’s 
judgment in Ex Parte Whitbread, supra note 16). Th e jurisdiction 
of the Courts, descended from the King’s delegation of his personal 
responsibility to the Lord Chancellor, developed into something like an 
equitable jurisdiction “by virtue of [the Chancellor’s] general power, as 
holding the great seal, and keeper of the Kings conscience.” Ibid at 19, 
referring to Story’s Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as Administered 
in England and America (12th ed, 1877) 608.  See also Surtees, supra note 
9.  
19. Harmon, supra note 10 at 22.
20. Ibid at 25.
21. See discussion in Margaret Isabel Hall, “Mental Capacity in the (Civil) 
Law: Capacity, Autonomy and Vulnerability” (2012) 58:1 McGill LJ 61 at 
71-74.
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are involved in the process.22 Th e increasing privatization of the once 
public guardianship process through the rise of the enduring power 
of attorney and other “personal planning” instruments such as health 
directives (in British Columbia, the representation agreement) has made 
the involvement of the courts increasingly less likely. Th ese private 
instruments provide for the individual him or herself to appoint a remedial 
decision-maker of some kind (substitute or supportive) without public 
oversight, a “least interventionist” alternative. Within the conceptual 
framework of the substitute decision-making model, the friend or family 
member appointed through a private process is best placed to know 
the individual’s “prior intentional states” and to eff ect the decision that 
individual would have made if able to do so. Th e result of these processes 
has been a dwindling of the public/legal role in the guardianship process, 
and a transformation (in accordance with the liberal conceptualization of 
liberty and individualism) of the old idea that a public obligation of some 
kind is owed to persons whose processes of thought and mind are seen to 
create or exacerbate vulnerability to harm.  
Th e rise of the advanced directive expands on, and in a sense perfects, 
these processes, directly enforcing the individual’s “former intentional 
state” regarding a particular kind of decision – decisions about health 
care – without the need for a third person intermediary or amanuensis. 
Within the limited scope of decisions to which it applies, the advanced 
directive maximizes autonomy by enabling the individual to directly eff ect 
his or her own “real” decisions, regardless of decision-making capacity, up 
to the point of death.  Th e process is a legal one only to the extent that it 
is enabled by legislation, and the private nature of the advance directive 
as a direct exchange between individual and physician is intended to 
construct, in so far as possible, a “normal” medical decision (as if the 
patient were any other “normal” decision-competent individual).  
IV.  Situating Dementia: Margo’s Story
Harmon discusses at some length how the doctrine of substitute 
decision-making came to provide the basis for “substitute” health care 
22. See Glyn Davies & Lesley Taylor, “Private Committeeship in British 
Columbia: A Study of Due Process” (1989) 8:1 Can J Fam L 185.
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decision-making on behalf of developmentally disabled persons. Th e 
fi ction lost all coherence in this context, according to Harmon; unlike 
the wealthy, lunatic uncle in the Ex Parte Whitbread case, there could 
be no evidence of such a person’s “former intentional state” from which 
to draw conclusions about what he or she would have done. Indeed, 
there was no former “real” self on whose behalf the substitute could 
act; the real self was the present self. Harmon provides several examples 
of purportedly “substitute” decisions that were dramatically contra the 
interests of the (present-self ) individuals on whose behalf they had been 
made.23 Harmon argues that substitute decision-making operated in this 
context as a blatant and self-serving fi ction, employed for the purpose 
of benefi tting (through organ transplant, for example, and the refusal 
of life saving treatments) other persons at the expense of the incapable 
individual.24   
Dementia poses other diffi  culties for the substitute decision-making 
model. In one sense (and unlike the developmentally disabled person) 
the person with dementia falls into the category of persons formerly 
characterised as lunatics, for whom evidence of former intentional states 
can be found. Unlike the lunatic (in the archaic distinction), however, 
there is no “glimmer of hope” that the individual with dementia will be 
restored to her or his former self. Indeed the very nature of dementia 
entails the progressive movement away from that former self, ending in 
death. Is this process a loss of self (the “living death” or zombie trope) or 
a changed self? And if the substitute decision model (in all of its modern 
iterations) works as a mechanism for enacting the “would-have-been” 
“real” decisions of the individual, how does that mechanism protect the 
autonomy of an individual with no or little current connection to that 
past self?  
Ronald Dworkin and Rebecca Dresser have both considered 
this question through the story of Margo, a woman with Alzheimer’s 
disease whose story was originally told by Andrew Firlik in a Journal of 
23. Th ese developments comprise the focus of her article.
24. And the incoherence of substitute decision-making may be a key reason 
for the development of supportive decision-making by and on behalf of 
the developmentally disabled community (and the relative incoherence of 
supported decision-making in the context of dementia).
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the America Medical Association column called “A Piece of my Mind.”25 
Firlik describes Margo as “undeniably one of the happiest people I have 
known,” absorbed in reading and re-reading of her novel and painting 
abstracts in warm and rosy colours:
Th ere is something graceful about the degeneration [Margo’s] mind is 
undergoing, leaving her carefree, always cheerful.  Do her problems, whatever 
she may perceive them to be, simply fail to make it to the worry centers of her 
brain?  How does Margo maintain her sense of self?  When a person can no longer 
accumulate new memories as the old rapidly fade, what remains?  Who is Margo? 26
    In his response to Margo’s story, Ronald Dworkin considers the 
following moral and ethical dilemma: what if Margo, prior to her mental 
“degeneration,” had expressed a desire to have her life ended in the 
event that she developed Alzheimer’s disease? 27 Dworkin concludes that 
Margo’s previous wishes should be honoured regardless of Margo’s current 
contented state of mind. Honouring Margo as an autonomous being, in 
Dworkin’s account, requires honouring her interest in “living her life in 
character,” a “critical” interest of higher value than the mere “experiential” 
interests all humans enjoy as sentient beings (the taste of delicious food; 
listening to agreeable sounds). Th ose with the mental capacity to do 
so construct their identity as autonomous beings through the choices 
they make throughout their lives; the autonomous character of “Ronald 
Dworkin” is the outcome of this process, and “Ronald Dworkin” has a 
critical interest in constructing and maintaining this autonomous self. 
Acting in Margo’s best interests requires maintaining the autonomous self 
that Margo constructed while she was capable of doing so; once Margo 
loses the capacity to, eff ectively, change her storyline, there is no one else 
qualifi ed to do that on her behalf, and the most accurate information 
25. AD Firlik, “Margo’s Logo” (1991) 265:2 Th e Journal of the American 
Medical Association 201.  Th e immediate concern of both Dworkin and 
Dresser is substitute decision-making in the context of health treatment 
– specifi cally, end of life decision-making, extending to euthanasia. 
Th e essential terms of the argument apply to the workability and moral 
justifi cation of substitute decision-making generally in the dementia 
context, however.    
26. Ibid as cited in Rebecca Dresser, “Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Th eory, 
Questionable Policy” (1995) 25:6 Hastings Center Report 32 at 32.
27. R Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and 
Individual Freedom (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1993).
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available resides in Margo’s previously expressed wishes (a time when 
she was still “Margo” and still able to make the kinds of decisions that 
would determine who “Margo” would be – in Dworkin’s scenario, 
“Margo” would not be a woman with dementia). If Margo did not leave 
instructions before losing the capacity to do so, according to Dworkin, 
“the law should so far as possible leave decisions in the hands of [her] 
relatives or other people close to [her] whose sense of [her] best interests 
[in Dworkin’s sense of maintaining Margo’s autonomous character]… 
is likely to be much sounder than some universal, theoretical, abstract 
judgment.”28 
Rebecca Dresser has responded to and rejected Dworkin’s argument 
on the basis (in her terms) of either “wisdom or morality.”29 Prior to 
developing dementia, Dresser notes, it is highly doubtful that Margo 
had any real understanding of what her lived experience of dementia 
would be (apart from the mainstream narrative of “horrifying disease”). 
More fundamentally, Dresser writes, “Dworkin assumes that Margo 
the dementia patient is the same person who issued the earlier requests 
to die, despite the drastic psychological alteration that has occurred.”30 
Th at assumption is not self-evident, and the morality of imposing the 
will of a now disappeared self onto the life of a current and existing self 
is problematic,31 either directly (as through an advance directive) or 
through the “substitute” decisions of a guardian.  
28. Ibid at 213.
29. Dresser, supra note 26 at 34; see also Rebecca Dresser, “Missing Persons: 
Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients” (1994) 46:2 Rutgers L Rev 
609.
30. Ibid at 35.
31. See also James Lindemann Nelson & Hilde Lindemann Nelson, eds, 
Meaning and Medicine: A Reader in the Philosophy of Health Care (New 
York: Routledge, 1999) at 47-56; Allen Buchanan, “Advance Directives 
and the Personal Identity Problem” (1988) 17:4 Philosophy and Public 
Aff airs 277; Seana Valentine Shiff rin, “Autonomy, Benefi cence, and the 
Permanently Demented” in Justine Burley, ed, Dworkin and His Critics: 
With Replies by Dworkin (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004) 195.
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V.  Bentley v Maplewood Seniors Care Society
Bentley v Maplewood Seniors Care Society engages, implicitly, with the 
fundamental questions of consent and autonomy which substitute 
decision-making appears to resolve, and the extent to which that (apparent) 
resolution loses coherence in the context of dementia.32 What is the 
relationship between autonomy, the self-with-dementia, and the former 
self? Are the decisions of the former self “real” (the result of refl ection 
and, through that process, the deliberate adoption of identity) in a way 
that the choices of the self-with-dementia are not? Is it a betrayal of that 
real self (and therefore an abnegation of the individual’s true autonomy) 
to prefer and give eff ect to the choices of the self-with-dementia? What 
are the obligations of a substitute decision-maker in this situation? 
Th e case concerned Margot Bentley, a resident at the Maplewood 
care facility. Mrs. Bentley had been diagnosed as suff ering from advanced 
Alzheimer’s disease. Mrs. Bentley is described in the case as having “very 
few physical movements,” “occasionally rub[bing] the back of her hand, 
arm, or face” with “[h]er eyes … closed much of the time. She has not 
spoken since 2010. She does not indicate through her behaviour that 
she recognizes her family members or any other person.”33 Th e British 
Columbia Supreme Court agreed with an assessment carried out by a 
hospice care physician that Mrs. Bentley was not dying, “[d]espite her 
cognitive and physical disabilities”; if the petitioners’ application was 
granted she would die from starvation or dehydration, rather than from 
any eff ect of Alzheimer’s disease.34
32. Oxford Dictionaries, sub verbo “dementia”, online: Oxford Dictionaries 
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/defi nition/english/dementia>. 
“Dementia” here refers to “[a] chronic or persistent disorder of the mental 
processes caused by brain disease or injury and marked by memory 
disorders, personality changes, and impaired reasoning” and includes, 
but is not limited to, Alzheimer’s. Th e Bentley case concerns an individual 
with Alzheimer’s, but the issues raised by the case apply to dementia more 
broadly.  
33. Supra note 1 at para 18.
34. Ibid at para 33.
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Staff  at Maplewood “assisted” Mrs.  Bentley with eating and drinking 
by:
[P]lacing a spoon or glass on her lower lip. When she opens her mouth to 
accept nourishment or liquid, the care attendant places the nourishment 
or liquid in her mouth and Mrs. Bentley swallows it. When she keeps 
her mouth closed despite being prompted, the care attendant will try 
again. If she keeps her mouth closed despite a couple of attempts, the care 
attendant makes no attempt to force her to accept nourishment or liquid.35
Confl icting medical evidence was provided regarding Mrs. Bentley’s 
apparent “choice” to participate in the spoon feeding. A hospice palliative 
care physician who assessed Mrs. Bentley concluded the she was “clearly” 
(if non-verbally) “choos[ing] to eat.” 36 An assessment of Mrs. Bentley’s 
decision-making capacity was also carried out by an Incapacity Assessor 
with the Offi  ce of the Public Guardians and Trustee. Th e assessor agreed 
that Mrs. Bentley was choosing to eat, and found that her behaviour 
(opening her mouth in response to dessert after refusing the fi nal portion 
of her dinner) conveyed Mrs. Bentley’s choices about what food to eat. 
Although Mrs. Bentley “does not make eye contact or appear to respond 
in other ways when people try to interact with her” she did “grasp the 
hands of people who speak to her” and “convey[ed] when she is in pain by 
moaning and tightening her facial muscles.”37 Mrs. Bentley’s condition 
was described by her GP, in contrast, as “a vegetative state.”38 In the 
opinion of the GP “any response Mrs. Bentley has when she is prompted 
with a spoon or glass is ‘a refl ex and is not indicative of any conscious 
decision about whether to eat or not’ … [s]he does not function mentally 
in any discernible way.”39  
Mrs. Bentley, through her litigation guardian,40 together with her 
husband and daughter, now sought a declaration from the Court that 
Maplewood stop the spoon feeding. Maplewood, the Fraser Health 
Authority (“FHA”), the Province of British Columbia (the “Province”), 
and the intervenor, Euthanasia Prevention Coalition of British Columbia 
35. Ibid at para 19.
36. Ibid at para 24.
37. Ibid at para 27.
38. Ibid at para 22.
39. Ibid.
40. Mrs. Bentley’s litigation guardian was also her daughter. 
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argued that to stop giving Mrs. Bentley nourishment or liquids would 
cause her discomfort and bring about her death through dehydration 
and starvation, constituting neglect within the meaning of the  Adult 
Guardianship Act,41 and possibly violating several criminal laws, including 
the prohibition against assisted suicide.
Th e petitioners argued that a “statement of wishes” written and 
signed by Mrs. Bentley in 1991 required Maplewood to stop providing 
her with liquids and nutrition, either directly as an “advanced directive” 
or through the substitute decision-making authority it conferred on them 
as her “representatives.” Th e statement of wishes provided that: 
If at such a time the situation should arise that there is no reasonable 
expectation of my recovery from extreme physical or mental disability, I 
direct that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive by artifi cial means or 
“heroic measures”; that “no nourishment or liquids” be provided; and 
that “[i]n the event that mental deterioration is such that I am unable 
to recognize the members of my family, I ask that I be euthanized.42  
Th e statement of wishes also designated Mrs. Bentley’s husband as 
her “proxy for the purpose of making medical decisions on my behalf in 
the event that I become incompetent and unable to make such decisions 
for myself ” and her daughter as alternative proxy.43 A second, undated 
“statement of wishes” was subsequently found providing that:
If the time comes when I can no longer communicate, this declaration shall be 
taken as a testament to my wishes regarding medical care. If it is the opinion of 
two independent doctors that there is no reasonable prospect of my recovery 
from severe physical illness, or from impairment expected to cause me severe 
distress or render me incapable of rational existence, then  I direct that I be 
allowed to die and not be kept alive by artifi cial means such as life support 
systems, tube feeding, antibiotics, resuscitation or blood transfusions: any 
treatment which has no benefi t other than a mere prolongation of my existence 
should be withheld or withdrawn, even if it means my life is shortened.44  
Th e specifi c reference to “nourishment or liquids” was omitted in 
this second statement. Th e petitioners argued that this second statement 
nevertheless did not contradict the fi rst, and in fact reinforced it.
Advance directives were not provided for in legislation in British 
41. RSBC 1996, c 6.
42. Supra note 1 at para 5.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid at para 9.
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Columbia until September 2011; 45 representation agreements were not 
provided for until 2000. 46 Th e petitioners argued that Mrs. Bentley 
intended her statement of wishes to operate as a “living will” (although 
no such instrument was legally recognised in British Columbia at the 
time) and that the statement should now be treated as having eff ectively 
created both an advance directive and a representation agreement.47 As 
an advance directive, the “statement of wishes” required Maplewood to 
stop feeding Mrs. Bentley.  As a representation agreement, the statement 
required Mrs. Bentley’s representatives – her husband and then her 
daughter – to ensure that her wishes were carried out, therefore entitling 
them to demand an end to the spoon feeding. 
Th e Court disagreed, on several bases. If the statement of wishes 
were to be treated as creating an advance directive, it was not clear 
that the refusal of “artifi cial means and heroic measures,” followed in 
the “statement of wishes” by a list of items including “nourishment or 
liquids,” was intended as a refusal of “heroic and artifi cial” methods of 
providing nourishment and liquids (such as tube feeding) or a refusal 
of liquid and nourishment per se. Th e “consensus in the medical 
community” (as attested to by a medical ethicist) was that “assistance 
with oral nutrition and hydration is neither artifi cial nor heroic.”48 A 
health care provider could not obtain consent from an advance directive 
where “the instructions in an adult’s advance directive are so unclear that 
it cannot be determined whether the adult has given or refused consent 
to the health care,”49 as in this case.
 In any event, the “statement of wishes” was not an advance directive 
for several reasons. Advance directives and representation agreements 
45. Health Care (Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act, RSBC 1996 c 
181, Part 2.1 [HCCCFA Act].
46. Representation Agreement Act, RSBC 1996, c 405 [RA Act].
47. See Health Care Consent Regulation, BC Reg 20/2000, s 15: although 
legislation introducing advance directives was not proclaimed in British 
Columbia until 2011, “written instructions made by a capable adult as 
described in that section are deemed to be advance directives if made and 
executed in accordance with sections 19.4 and 19.5 of the Act, as if those 
sections had been in force at the time the written instructions were made.”
48. Supra note 1 at para 111.
49. HCCCFA Act, supra note 45, s 19.8(1)(b). 
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are fundamentally diff erent documents: an advanced directive cannot 
appoint a substitute decision-maker (as this document purported to do). 
Furthermore, advance directives can only direct health care decisions; the 
spoon feeding in this case was not “health care,” but “personal care.” More 
invasive methods of feeding such as tube feeding could be characterized 
as “health care,” but spoon feeding could not. Th e Court noted also 
Maplewood’s argument that the Residential Care Regulations (applying 
to nutrition, assistance with eating, and meal plans for adults living in 
assisted living and care settings) required that Mrs. Bentley be provided 
with liquid and nutrition.50 
Of course, personal care also requires consent. In British Columbia, 
the Representation Agreement Act51 sets out the mechanisms for appointing 
a substitute decision-maker for both personal and health care where 
a person is unable to consent.52 Th ere is no mechanism for creating a 
personal care advance directive, although a representative must consider 
the “previous intentional states” or wishes of the person on whose behalf 
he or she is acting and follow those wishes unless there are compelling 
reasons to do otherwise. Two kinds of representation agreements are 
available: a section 7 agreement (which can be made by a person with 
relatively lower mental capacity and which confers a more limited scope 
of decision-making authority on the representative)53 and a section 9 
50. See Residential Care Regulations, BC Reg 96/2009, ss 66-67.  Th e 
Regulations specify that a “licensee [Maplewood in this case] must ensure 
that each person in care receives adequate food to meet their personal 
nutritional needs, based on Canada’s Food Guide and the person in care’s 
nutrition plan”; that “a licensee must ensure that fl uids are provided to 
persons in care in suffi  cient quantity and variation to meet the needs and 
preferences of the persons in care”; and that “a licensee must provide each 
person in care with … eating aids, personal assistance or supervision, if 
required by a person in care who has diffi  culty eating, or the nutrition 
plan of a person in care.”  
51. Supra note 46, s 1. 
52. “Personal care” is defi ned in the RA Act, ibid to include matters respecting 
“the shelter, employment, diet and dress of an adult” (the emphasis is 
provided in the case), “participation by an adult in social, educational, 
vocational and other activities, contact or association by an adult with 
other persons, and licences, permits, approvals or other authorizations of 
an adult to do something.” 
53. See ibid, s 7. A section 7 representative can also carry out fi nancial 
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agreement (which authorises the representative “to do anything that 
the representative considers necessary in relation to the personal care or 
health care of the adult,” including giving or refusing consent to “health 
care necessary to preserve life.”)54 Within these parameters the person 
making the agreement can confer more or less decision-making authority 
on the representative. If Mrs. Bentley had wanted to create a de facto 
representation agreement conferring personal decision-making authority 
on her “proxies,” she would have done so.
Th e petitioners argued that the statement of wishes should be 
construed as a representation agreement (presumably a section 9) and 
that their designation as “proxies” eff ectively appointed them as Mrs. 
Bentley’s health care and/or personal care substitute decision-makers.55 If 
the statement were read as creating a representation agreement, however, it 
purported to appoint the two proxies as health care decision-makers only 
(“to serve as my proxy for the purpose of making medical decision on my 
behalf in the event that I become incompetent and unable to make such 
decisions for myself ”56) with no mention of personal care. Th e authority 
to make one kind of decision could not be taken to imply the other 
and the statement could not be construed as conferring decision-making 
authority regarding personal care.
Most signifi cantly, however, even if the “statement of wishes” could 
operate as either an advance directive or a representation agreement (or 
both), the Court concluded that Mrs. Bentley was capable of consenting 
to the spoon feeding and that, through her behaviour, she did consent to 
it.57 Th e existence and content of any advance directive or representation 
management for the individual (a person who is not capable of appointing 
a power of attorney may appoint a section 7 representative). 
54. Ibid, s 9.
55. Although the RA Act came into force in 2000 and the Statement of 
Wishes was completed in 1991, s 39 of that Act provides that “[a]n 
agreement that was made before this Act authorized the making of a 
representation agreement, and would have been a valid representation 
agreement if, at the time the agreement was made, this Act had authorized 
the making of a representation agreement, is valid and is deemed for all 
purposes to have been made under this Act.”
56. Supra note 1 at para 101.
57. Th e fact that Mrs. Bentley could not, currently, communicate as she 
did previously did not indicate an inability to consent; indeed, the RA 
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agreement she may have put in place was therefore irrelevant. Th e extent 
to which Mrs. Bentley’s current consent contradicted any previously 
expressed wishes was also irrelevant: 
It is entirely possible that the decisions Mrs. Bentley predicted she would 
make for herself in the future through her “proxies” and as set out in her 
statements of wishes are diff erent than the decisions she is currently making. 
All adults are entitled to change their mind subsequent to creating written 
instructions, which is one of the risks associated with written instructions 
for the future. Th is Court must consider the possibility that Mrs. Bentley’s 
previously expressed wishes are not valid in the face of her current consent.58
Mrs. Bentley’s current consent must be respected, and the spoon 
feeding continued.
VI. Conclusion
Mrs. Bentley’s husband and daughter told the Court that they could 
“no longer see in Mrs. Bentley the active and creative person that they 
knew as their wife and mother,”59 characterizing her as “vegetative.”60 
She appeared to no longer recognize her family members, and could not 
speak. Th e “Margo Bentley” the petitioners knew had ceased to exist. 
Th at Margo, they now argued, deserved to have her autonomous voice 
heard and respected; the apparent choices of Mrs. Bentley’s self-with 
dementia were not real decisions but refl exes. Th e Court disagreed.
Importantly, that conclusion was not justifi ed on the basis that Mrs. 
Bentley’s choices were in any way the product of a deliberate process of 
consideration. Th ere is no reference in the judgment to the extent of 
her decision-making or mental capacity, only to her choices as indicated 
by her behaviours. Th e Court’s decision implies that this process – that 
“decision-making capacity” – is not, in fact, the essential factor here; 
that where a living human being indicates an embodied choice, that 
choice must be respected as “real” regardless of the intellectual process 
Act, Adult Guardianship Act, and HCCCFA Act all include provisions 
indicating that an adult is presumed to be mentally capable and that 
diffi  culties with communication are not to be interpreted as indicating a 
diminishment of mental capacity.
58. Supra note 1 at para 54.
59. Ibid at para 56.
60. Ibid at para 57.
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that produced it. Th e petitioners may be right, in other words, to the 
extent that Mrs. Bentley’s current “consent” to the spoon feeding is not 
a decision (in the way that her “statement of wishes” is an expression 
of decisions). But those prior decisions do not override Mrs. Bentley’s 
current choice in this context. It is right that embodied choices, even 
in the absence of rational decision-making processes, should determine 
what does and does not happen regarding the “personal care” of one’s 
body.     
Th e case has been widely discussed in the media as a “right to die” 
and “dying with dignity” case. Th e Vancouver Sun reported that “Bentley 
has been in a vegetative state since late 2011. Since then the family has 
pleaded for adherence to the living will. Her case has gained national 
attention and Th e Vancouver Sun has received many letters from readers, 
almost all of them outraged that the nursing home is not respecting 
Mrs. Bentley’s wishes.”61 According to the Globe and Mail, Margo 
Bentley, a former nurse, 
was determined not to die a slow, lonely, frightful death like so many 
of her patients. So she planned ahead. Bentley wrote a living will, 
one that clearly stated that, when her time came, she did not want 
heroic measures taken to keep her alive. She also discussed the issue 
with her children, fully and open ly, and they were in agreement.62
Bentley did everything right. Yet today, the 82-year-old, who is in the 
fi nal stages of dementia, is being kept “alive” against her wishes and 
those of her family. And the B.C. Supreme Court says that’s okay.
How could this happen?
When will the wishes of patients fi nally and rightfully take precedence over 
the paternalistic prurience of the medico-legal establishment? When will we 
stop torturing people in the name of legalistic hair-splitting and fully embrace 
essential principles such as having treatment choices and death with dignity?63
61. Tiff any Crawford, “Right-to-die: Fraser Health says it has a legal 
obligation to spoon-feed vegetative patient”, Th e Vancouver Sun (12 
September 2014) online: Th e Vancouver Sun <http://www.vancouversun.
com>.  
62. Andre Picard, “Margot Bentley case shows our health care system values 
its bureaucracy over its patients”, Th e Globe and Mail (10 February 2014) 
online: Th e Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
63. Ibid.
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Th e public discourse around the Margo Bentley case essentially (if 
implicitly) adopts Ronald Dworkin’s position regarding Firlik’s “Margo.” 
It demonstrates, powerfully, the cultural entrenchment of the modern 
adult guardianship paradigm, as a means of carrying the “real” self forward 
despite the embodied manifestation of the self-with-dementia. Th e 
dominant discourse that both constructs and surrounds dementia (the 
“living death” after the loss of self ) is of a piece with these cultural values 
and beliefs (and, therefore, with the substitute decision-making model 
that is congruent with them). Th e decision of the British Columbia 
Supreme Court in Bentley provides an alternative account of the self-with-
dementia as an alternate self (as opposed to non-self ) that is capable of 
making choices of a certain kind; those choices look and almost certainly 
are diff erent in kind from the decisions of the “normal” unimpaired self, 
and arrived at through diff erent mental processes, but this diff erence does 
not negate their meaning. Th e implications of this account are potentially 
far-reaching, as society prepares for the “rising tide” of dementia.64  
Bentley shows the court and the medical players – what the Globe 
and Mail refers to as the “medico-legal establishment”65 – eff ectively 
exercising a public guardian-like role vis-à-vis Margo Bentley (although 
of course neither is acting as her actual guardian) in contravention 
of those whose would assume that role in their private capacity (as 
Mrs. Bentley’s representatives or through enforcement of an advance 
directive). “Guardian-like” here refers not to the legislated mechanisms 
of guardianship but to the old idea referred to at the beginning of this 
article, of which the modern adult guardianship paradigm is merely the 
latest (but almost certainly not the fi nal) iteration: that a public obligation 
of some kind is owed to persons whose processes of thought and mind are 
seen to create or exacerbate vulnerability to harm.  
Th e modern idea (or paradigm)66 of adult guardianship as a response 
64. Alzheimer Society of Canada, Rising Tide: Th e Impact of Dementia on 
Canadian Society, Alzheimer Society of Canada (2010), online: Alzheimer 
Society of Canada <http://www.alzheimer.ca>. 
65. Picard, supra note 62.
66. Th e Oxford English Dictionary, sub verbo “paradigm”, online: Oxford 
Dictionaries <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/defi nition/english/
paradigm>. “Paradigm” is defi ned as “a world view underlying the theories 
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to impaired decision-making is just that – an idea, neither natural nor 
inevitable. “Ideas are … tools- like forks and knives and microchips- that 
people devise to cope with the world in which they fi nd themselves,” 
and “their survival depends not on their immutability but on their 
adaptability.”67  
Th e Bentley case suggests that the self-with-dementia needs a response 
of a diff erent kind, a departure from the modern adult guardianship 
paradigm and from the theoretical hegemony of the decision.
 
and methodology of a particular scientifi c subject.”
67. Louis Menand, Th e Metaphysical Club (New York: Farrar, Strauss and 
Giroux, 2001) at xi.


